Hastings Women’s Law Journal
Volume 17
Number 2 Summer 2006

Article 5

1-1-2006

Coercion in California: Eugenics Reconstituted in
Welfare Reform, the Contracting of Reproductive
Capcity, and Terms of Probation
Janet Simmonds

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hwlj
Part of the Law and Gender Commons
Recommended Citation
Janet Simmonds, Coercion in California: Eugenics Reconstituted in Welfare Reform, the Contracting of Reproductive Capcity, and Terms of
Probation, 17 Hastings Women's L.J. 269 (2006).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hwlj/vol17/iss2/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Women’s Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.

SIMMONDS - FOR CHRISTENSEN

4/12/2006 9:48 AM.

Coercion in California: Eugenics Reconstituted in
Welfare Reform, the Contracting of Reproductive
Capacity, and Terms of Probation
Janet Simmonds∗
I. INTRODUCTION
In an era where courts are reaffirming landmark right to privacy
decisions,1 such as Griswold v. Connecticut,2 Eisenstadt v. Baird,3 and Roe
v. Wade,4 and expanding the scope of a constitutionally protected right to
privacy, it is seemingly unthinkable to imagine that the exercise of such
rights is being legally perverted to promote eugenic ideals. However, this
is precisely what has been happening. In particular, this Note addresses
how the state of California and private actors within the state are using
legally sanctioned means to coerce women into making decisions regarding
their reproductive capacities that are in effect, and perhaps in purpose,
eugenic in nature.
Today, the application of eugenics5 is thought of as a bygone horror.
∗

J.D. Candidate, May 2006, University of California, Hastings College of the Law;
M.A., Anthropology, San Francisco State University, May 2002; B.A. Anthropology, Rice
University, January 2000. I would like to thank Professor D. Kelly Weisberg and the
members of the Hastings Women’s Law Journal, especially associate editor Sarah Orman
and members Sandra Kain and Kristen Ross, for their assistance in editing this note.
I would also like to express my gratitude to my family, in particular my mother Barbara and
my husband Denver, for their unconditional support.
1. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding the right to privacy
protected by the Constitution includes the right to engage in intimate conduct undisturbed
by the government).
2. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding a Connecticut restriction
on contraceptive use a violation of the constitutional right to marital privacy).
3. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending the holding of Griswold;
unmarried individuals also have a constitutional right to privacy that precludes a restriction
on contraceptives).
4. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding the constitutional right to privacy
includes the right to abortion).
5. Eugenics is defined as “[t]he study of hereditary improvement of a breed or race,
especially of human beings, by genetic control.” THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY
(2nd ed. 1983).
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Most notably, eugenical thought was the basis of a series of crimes against
humanity utilized to further the racist ideologies of fearsome regimes like
that of Hitler6 or Pol Pot.7 Yet, the United States has its own intimate
history with the pseudo-science.8 A dark moment in our judicial history is
forever recorded in the Supreme Court opinion of Buck v. Bell.9 In Buck,
the Court upheld a Virginia law that provided for the sterilization of
persons who were institutionalized for insanity or imbecility.10 It is from
this case that we get Justice Wendell Holmes’ infamous quote, “It is better
for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for
crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those
who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. . . . Three generations
of imbeciles are enough.”11 The Court has since criticized the case, and
even very recently had occasions to reference it, yet the Court never
overturned the holding.12
6. JAMES M. GLASS, “LIFE UNWORTHY OF LIFE”: RACIAL PHOBIA AND MASS MURDER
HITLER’S GERMANY (Basic Books 1997). In an effort to “[rebuild] a genetically fit race”
after World War I, German officials used means of applied biology and negative eugenics to
cleanse society of the diseased and criminal aspects of society: Jews and other undesirables.
Id. at 31. From 1934-1945, an estimated 1 percent of Germans were sterilized under a 1933
sterilization law (aimed at Jews). Id. at 39. The German bureaucrats saw this as a way to
save national funds and get rid of welfare for the biologically inferior. Id. The actual
numbers of sterilizations performed by the Nazis is hard to pinpoint; the numbers vary from
360,000 to 3,500,000 between 1933 and 1945 alone. Paul A. Lombardo, Medicine,
Eugenics, and the Supreme Court: From Coercive Sterilization to Reproductive Freedom,
13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 12 (1996); Holocaust Museum Houston Holocaust
Facts, http://www.hmh.org/ed_faqs.asp (last visited April 11, 2006). In the end, the Nazis
began the “Final Solution” to completely rid Europe of Jews. Overall an estimated
5,830,000 Jews were killed during the Nazi regime, plus other undesirables, such as
Communists, trade unionists, Socialists, Roma and Sinti (Gypsies), Jehovah’s Witnesses,
Soviet citizens, Soviet prisoners of war, and homosexuals.
7. The Cambodian Genocide Program, http://www.yale.edu/cgp/ (last visited April
11, 2006). The Khmer Rouge regime, led by Pol Pot, killed an estimated 1,700,000
Cambodians (21 percent of the population) between 1975-1979. The purpose of the
genocide was to reconstruct Cambodia as a Communist Peasant society. Thus, large
numbers of professionals, military personnel, and ethnic minorities were killed. Those who
were spared were relocated from the urban areas to the countryside, where they were starved
and forced to work as laborers. Peace Pledge Union Information, Talking about GenocideGenocides Cambodia 1975, http://www.ppu.org.uk/genocide/g_cambodia1.html (last visited
April 11, 2006).
8. Eugenics has largely been debunked, but lives on in works such as that of
RICHARD HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS
STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (The Free Press 1994).
9. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 207.
12. Justice Souter in his concurrence in Tenn. v. Lane, cited the case in reference to
the “situation of disabled individuals before the courts.” 541 U.S. 509, 534 (2004). Buck
was a footnote in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531
U.S. 356, 369 (2001): “The record does show that some states adopting the tenets of the
eugenics movement of the early part of this century, required extreme measures such as
sterilization of persons suffering from hereditary mental disease. These laws were upheld
against constitutional attack 70 years ago in Buck v. Bell. But there is no indication that any
IN
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In 2003, California Governor Gray Davis issued a formal apology to
the victims (and their families) who were sterilized under California’s
eugenics laws.13 Davis said, “The people of California are deeply sorry for
the suffering you endured over the years. Our hearts are heavy for the pain
caused by eugenics. It was a sad and regrettable chapter in the state’s
history, and it is one that must never be repeated again.”14 The strong
implication in Davis’s statement is that eugenic measures that deny citizens
their reproductive rights are a thing of the past. Yet, today in California,
there exist several forms of coercive measures that result in the loss of
reproductive rights.
In this Note, I will first traverse the history of the eugenics movement
in California. Next, I will look at the California welfare system’s use of a
family cap (or child exclusion) program to limit the number of offspring
born to poor women. Then I will discuss Project Prevention, a Californiabased organization that coerces poor, drug-addicted women into
relinquishing their fertility for a drug fix. Next, I will briefly address the
creative sentencing used in the probation terms of semi-permanent
contraception proposed in two California cases. Finally, I will ground
these discussions in the right to bodily integrity that is held within the
constitutional right to privacy. Throughout this Note I will also focus on
the trope of deserving poor versus undeserving poor that underlies our laws
and attitudes.

II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF EUGENICS IN CALIFORNIA
A. EUGENICS
The ideology of eugenics is at odds with the American ideals of
freedom and bodily integrity. Even now, however, in a time when personal
autonomy has been cemented by American jurisprudence, eugenical means
of population control continue and thrive. These methods, which interfere
with reproductive privacy, are not mere remnants from a bygone era when
America played a leading role in the eugenics movement worldwide; these
methods are recreated every day.
1. A General Look
Rooted in hard science, eugenics promised to solve some of the biggest
social problems plaguing the modern world. Eugenics comes from the
Greek; it means “to be well born.”15 The eugenics movement developed
state had persisted in requiring such harsh measures as of 1990 when the ADA was
adopted.” (Citation omitted.)
13. California Apologizes for Sterilization Law, Associated Press, Mar. 12, 2003,
http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/West/03/12/davis.sterilization.ap (last visited April 11, 2006).
14. Id.
15. California’s Compulsory Sterilization Policies, 1909-1979: Informational
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from the early genetic work of Gregor Mendel.16 Biological in theory,
“[t]he goal of the eugenics movement was to improve the human race by
preventing the genetically unfit from passing on their undesirable traits to
their offspring.”17 Francis Galton, a European geneticist and the father of
eugenics, defined it as “the study of the agencies under social control that
may improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations either
physically or mentally.”18 Eugenics became a global phenomenon.19 In
America, during the Progressive era,20 many people were concerned with
“modern” problems like crime, poverty and overcrowding in the urban
areas. Eugenics seemed to provide a solution.21 At the turn of the twentieth
century in America, there were already several mechanisms for controlling
“the face of the body politic”: 1) immigration;22 2) institutionalization; 3)
regulation of entry into marriage;23 and, in the extreme, 4) sterilization of
the unfit.24 The remainder of this discussion will focus on the sterilization
of the unfit, and, in particular, California’s past and present role in
eugenics.
Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Genetics, Genetic Technologies and Public Policy,
2003 Leg. 1242-S at 3 (Cal. 2003) (presentation by Dr. Alexandra Minna Stern, “The
Darker Side of the Golden State: Eugenics Sterilization in California,” July 16, 2003).
16. Michael G. Silver, Note, Eugenics and Compulsory Sterilization Laws:
Providing Redress for the Victims of a Shameful Era in United States History, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 862, 864-65 (2004). An argument can be made that eugenics predates
Mendel. For example, Spartans committed infanticide against any infant showing birth
defects. Archaeological excavations have also found proof of “baby disposal” areas inside
Roman bordellos that were the resting place of “undesired” babies born to prostitutes. Oana
Iftime, A Few Considerations on Ancient and Modern Eugenics, 13 EUBIOS J. OF ASIAN AND
INT’L BIOETHICS 221 (2003), http://www2.unescobkk.org/eubios/EJ136/ej136j.htm.
17. California’s Compulsory Sterilization Policies, 1909-1979: Hearing Before the
S. Select Comm. on Genetics, Genetic Technologies and Public Policy, 2003 Leg. iv (Cal.
2003). “[U]ndesirable traits often included ‘feeblemindedness,’ epilepsy, alcoholism,
‘moral or sexual degeneracy,’ drug addiction, and pauperism.”
18. Silver, supra note 16, at 865.
19. Stern, supra note 15, at 3.
20. Silver, supra note 16, at 865: “Eugenics ‘fit perfectly with Progressive ideology’
because eugenicists ‘were scientifically trained experts who sought to apply rational
principles to solving problems of anti-social and problematic behavior by seeking out the
cause, in this case poor heredity.’”
21. California’s Compulsory Sterilization Policies, supra note 17, at iv.
22. “The eugenicist thought [Jewish and Italian] immigrants would threaten public
morality, poison the ‘American’ gene pool, and were ‘liable to become. . . public
charge[s]’.” The national origins quota system was premised on eugenic thought and was
enforced under the Federal Immigration Restriction Act of 1924 until it was replaced by the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. Lombardo, supra note 6, at 5-6 (quoting ALAN
M. KRAUT, SILENT TRAVELERS: GERMS, GENES AND THE “IMMIGRANT MENACE” (Basic
Books 1994)).
23. Eugenics theorists “characterized miscegenation (racial mixing) as a threat to the
health of the white gene pool.” An example of the laws that existed in many states was that
of Virginia’s 1924 Racial Integrity Act, which was found to violate the constitutionally
protected right to privacy in 1967’s Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1. Lombardo, supra note
6, at 19-20.
24. Stern, supra note 15, at 4.
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2. Eugenics in California25
In the Golden State, the eugenics movement had a uniquely Californian
flavor. “It was always linked to the use of land: to agriculture and plant
hybridization.”26 It was breeding applied to humans.
A powerful network of social workers, doctors, psychiatrists, biologists
and philanthropists furthered the ideas of eugenics.27 They were mostly
white Protestants who helped enact exclusionary laws to the detriment of
California’s Indian, Mexican, and Asian populations.28 A primary goal of
eugenics, besides developing a genetically better human race, was to save
the state money.29 The idea was that the state could reduce, or eliminate,
the amount of money that would otherwise go towards welfare and relief
programs.30
In 1909, California became the second state to pass a sterilization
law.31 The statute, called the Asexualization Act, provided for the
involuntary sterilization of certain categories of people, including inmates
of state hospitals, certain institutionalized persons, prisoners convicted for
life sentences, repeat offenders of certain sexual offenses, or just repeat
offenders.32 The caveat was that sterilization had to be thought to benefit
the individual physically, mentally or morally.33 The decision of whether to
sterilize, however, was largely left in the hands of the hospital or
institutions.34 The State Commission in Lunacy, founded in 1896 and in
charge of regulating the mental institutions of California, promulgated rules
to secure consent from the patient’s nearest relative before the sterilization
occurred.35 However, some sterilizations were performed without consent,
and in cases where consent was given, it is unknown how many of the
relatives were coerced into giving it by doctors and other personnel.36
25. See Jon Gottshall, The Cutting Edge: Sterilization and Eugenics in California,
1909-1945, http://www.gottshall.com/thesis/article.htm (last visited April 11, 2006) for a
concise, yet thorough discussion of California’s sterilization laws.
26. Stern, supra note 15, at 4.
27. Id. at 5.
28. Id. at 4.
29. Id. at 6.
30. Id.
31. Id. Indiana was the first state to pass such a law in 1907. Eventually over thirty
states would enact such laws. Mike Anton, Forced Sterilization Once Seen as Path to a
Better World; Decades of Files on Mental Patients Reveal How a Group of Noted
Californians Hoped to Influence the Fate of the Human Race, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 2003, at
A1.
32. California’s Compulsory Sterilization Policies, supra note 17, at v-vi.
33. Id. at vi.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. California’s Compulsory Sterilization Policies, supra note 17. In some cases,
family members even requested sterilization be performed for the benefit of the patient. In
particular, “mothers of young girls with unfortunate histories have requested that the work
be done for protection’s sake.” Anton, supra note 31: “Today, scholars believe consent for
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In 1913, the statute was repealed and replaced with another statute that
made sterilization a condition of discharge.37 In 1917, the sterilization law
was changed again, and further emphasized the genetic transmission of
undesirable traits.38 Under California’s sterilization law, 83 percent of
sterilizations in the United States had been performed in California by
1921.39 In the 1920s, the Human Betterment Foundation (HBF) was
founded in Pasadena, California.40 HBF, a nonprofit corporation with high
profile members and supporters, worked to promote eugenic sterilization
through research and information for the public.41
The eugenics movement in the United States culminated in the late
1930s.42 The Supreme Court’s 1927 decision in Buck v. Bell upheld the
constitutionality of a Virginia sterilization law, similar to California’s
law.43 Carrie Buck, the woman whose fertility was at issue in Buck, was
allegedly “feeble minded,” thus institutionalized and sterilized to prevent
her from producing more undesirables.44 Yet, recent detective work has
uncovered that Buck was of normal intelligence. The real reason she was
sent to an institution was to have a baby out of wedlock; and she
was sterilized “as a matter of sexual morality and social deviance.”45

many of California’s sterilizations were obtained through coercion. It was something
promoters knew at the time and kept hidden.”
37. California’s Compulsory Sterilization Policies, supra note 17, at vii. SB 881
(Butler), Chapter 363, Statutes of 1913: “Before any person who has been lawfully
committed to any state hospital for the insane, or who has been an inmate of the Sonoma
State Home, and who is afflicted with hereditary insanity or incurable chronic mania or
dementia shall be released or discharged there from, the state commission in lunacy may in
its discretion, after a careful investigation of all the circumstances of the case, cause such
person to be asexualized, and such asexualization, whether with or without the consent of
the patient, shall be lawful and shall not render the said commission, its members or any
person participating in the operation liable either civilly or criminally.”
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. California’s Compulsory Sterilization Policies, supra note 17, at iv.
41. Id. And the public, by and large, supported eugenics. “Every president from
Theodore Roosevelt to Herbert Hoover was a member of a eugenics organization, publicly
endorsed eugenic laws, or signed eugenic legislation without voicing opposition.”
Lombardo, supra note 6, at 1.
42. Stern, supra note 15, at 7.
43. 274 U.S. 200; Buck was a “radical departure from existing Supreme Court
medical jurisprudence.” The case “was the first and only instance in which the Court
allowed a physician, acting as the agent of state government, to perform an operation. . .
neither desired or needed by the ‘patient.’” Silver, supra note 16, at 867.
44. 274 U.S. at 205.
45. The detective work of both Stephen Jay Gould and Paul A. Lombardo revealed
that Carrie Buck was likely raped and impregnated and sent to an institution to hide that fact
and the identity of her rapist. In other words, it was a cover-up. Also, Carrie herself was
illegitimate, thus the sterilization was based more on the inheritance of social traits rather
than biological ones. Lombardo, supra note 6, at 9-10; Stephen Jay Gould, Carrie Buck’s
Daughter: A Popular, Quasi-Scientific Idea Can Be a Powerful Tool for Injustice, NAT.
HISTORY, July/Aug. 2002, at 12.
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This paved the way for other states to pass sterilization laws.’ Under these
laws, an estimated 60,000 people were involuntarily sterilized.47 One-third
of these persons, 20,000 people, were sterilized in California alone.48
Although at first more men than women were sterilized, the numbers
evened out as more and more girls and women were sterilized.49 The
sterilization of women “was very much about controlling the sexuality of
young single women and girls: those deemed to be wayward or
promiscuous.”50 Additionally, a disproportionate number of people of
color and foreign born individuals were sterilized.51 The same was true for
individuals from broken homes, or whose parents were laborers.52
3. The Descent of Eugenics
Eugenics began to experience a public relations setback during World
War II.53 Initially the setback was due to a national physician shortage,
then the Nuremberg trials in 1945 exposed the horror of Hitler’s eugenics.54
However, the sterilization laws remained and sterilizations continued; but
instead of protecting society, the sterilizations were then seen as
therapeutic.55 California’s sterilization law was finally repealed in 1979.56
Today, voluntary sterilization, with the individual’s full knowledge and
consent, is legal in California.58
The state of California has tried to make amends for its part in the
eugenics history of America.59 Governor Davis issued a formal apology in
2003.60 The California Senate Select Committee on Genetics, Genetic
Technologies and Public Policy has created Senate Concurrent Resolution

46. Stern, supra note 15, at 6-7.
47. Id. at 7.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 8.
50. Id. at 9. Anton, supra note 31: “‘One of the giggling dangerous type — a
delinquent sexually, morally. Forged checks, remained away from home nights,’ reads the
case file of a 16-year-old girl who was sent to the Sonoma State Home, sterilized and
released.”
51. Id. at 8; Anton, supra note 31.
52. Anton, supra note 31.
53. California’s Compulsory Sterilization Policies, supra note 17, at viii.
54. Id.
55. Id. “Up until the 1960s, the popular assumption was that patients’ [sic] accepted,
and often approved of, their sterilization.”
56. Stern, supra note 15, at 6-7.
57. Id. at ix.
58. Id.; CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1950-1969.
59. Another state complicit in the sterilization nightmare, North Carolina, has
proposed legislation to compensate its victims with $20,000 to each survivor who files a
claim by 2009. Editorial, North Carolina Could Make Amends for One of the Most
Shameful Practices in Its History with a Bill that Would Compensate Sterilization Victims,
NEWS & RECORD (Greensboro, NC), May 17, 2005, at A8.
60. California Apologizes for Sterilization Law, supra note 13.
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47.61 This resolution acknowledges California’s participation in the
eugenics movement and resolves to express its regret in that participation,
to honor all individuals, and to “urge every citizen of the state to become
familiar with the history of the eugenics movement, in the hope that a more
educated and tolerant populace will reject any similar abhorrent
pseudoscientific movement should one arise in the future.”62 Yet, there are
now in existence several forms of eugenics that are being tolerated by the
state of California.

II. MODERN FORMS OF EUGENICS IN CALIFORNIA
As “[t]he history of involuntary sterilization of institutionalized persons
demonstrates . . . society has sometimes not hesitated to pursue what it
perceived to be cost-saving measures at the expense of personal liberties.”63
Now, however, instead of forced sterilization of those with undesirable
traits, poor women in California are faced with new means of interference
with their personal liberties. These methods include: (1) limiting the
number of children for whom a woman on welfare can get state support; (2)
coercing drug-addicted women to surrender their reproductive capacities;
and (3) forcing contraception use as a term of probation.
A. FAMILY CAPS IN CALIFORNIA AND THE CONTRAVENTION OF
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS
1. The History of Family Cap Programs64
Unlike the flagrant violation of past undesirables’ right to reproductive
autonomy, experienced by thousands of individuals under the California
sterilization laws, current undesirables’ reproductive rights are being
impinged covertly by the welfare system. In particular, the family cap (or
child exclusion) policy forces poor women to choose between the wellbeing of her existing family and having more children.65 The history of
family cap programs is short. Each state makes the decision of whether
and how to implement a program. Family cap programs, in general,
prohibit families on welfare from receiving an increase in their benefits if
61. Filed with Secretary of State September 12, 2003.
62. Senate Concurrent Resolution 47.
63. PHILLIP REILLY, THE SURGICAL SOLUTION: A HISTORY OF INVOLUNTARY
STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 165 (1991).
64. For an in-depth discussion of the history of family caps, see Kelly J. Gastley,
Note, Why Family Cap Laws Just Aren’t Getting It Done, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373
(2004).
65. See Christina E. Norland Audigier, Comment, Starving Five to Prevent the Birth
of One?: An International Human Rights Analysis of Child Exclusion Provisions and the
Failure of Federal and State Constitutional Challenges, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 781 (2004)
(arguing family caps are punitive measures, and that while they have been continually
upheld by federal and state judiciaries, they cannot survive an international human rights
analysis).
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they have another child while on welfare.66 In California, a woman who
would have received an incremental increase of $3.50 per day upon the
birth of a new child prior to the implementation of the family cap program,
now must stretch her existing welfare payments to cover the cost of the
new child.67
In 1996, the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (“TANF”)
block program, which gives states the power to set up their own welfare
plans, eligibility requirements, and program elements, replaced Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (“AFDC”).68 Prior to TANF, beginning
in 1992, several states had implemented family cap programs under AFDC,
which required a special waiver for a state to implement the program.69
Now, under TANF, waivers are not required, making it easier for states to
adopt such programs. California and 23 other states currently have some
type of family cap program.70 The programs are not uniform; there are
variations from state to state.71 California, specifically, exempts children
conceived as a result of rape, incest, or failure of certain birth control
methods (IUD, Norplant, and sterilization.)72
2. The Rationale of Family Caps and Indications of Failure
The objective of the California maximum family grant (“MFG”) statute
(family cap program) is “to promote personal responsibility of welfare
recipients by discouraging growth in family size while they received public
assistance and by encouraging them, through work incentives, to support
their families and thereby eliminate their dependence on welfare.”73
66. Williams v. Martin, 283 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (N.D. Ga. 2003). More specifically,
there are two types of family caps. The first and more popular type is where there is no
increase in benefits upon the birth of a new child. In the second type, an increase is given
but is reduced for each child born. Additionally, the caps are implemented in three different
ways: (1) benefits are fixed; (2) the state issues vouchers instead of cash; or (3) the state
provides all families with the same flat grant regardless of the size of the family. Family
Caps: Do They Promote Personal Responsibility? After Nine Years, the Jury is Still Out,
http://www.ku.edu/~rlevy/public_Benefit_Law/reform_papers/familycaps.pdf (last visited
May 22, 2005).
67. Center for Law and Social Policy, Caps on Kids: Family Cap in the New Welfare
Era, http://www.clasp.org/publications/caps_on_kids.pdf (last visited April 11, 2006).
68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-608 (2004); Marion Banzhaf, Welfare Reform and
Reproductive Rights: Talking about Connections, http://www.fwhc.org/tanf.htm (last visited
April 11, 2006).
69. Legal Momentum, Background On Child Exclusion Proposals (Apr. 2000),
http://www.legalmomentum.org/issues/wel/childep.shtml (last visited April 11, 2006).
70. Center for Law and Social Policy, Lifting the Lid Off the Family Cap: States
Revisit Problematic Policy for Welfare Mothers, http://www.clasp.org/DMS/Documents/
1071852641.91/family_cap_brf.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2004).
71. Susan L. Thomas, “Ending Welfare As We Know It,” or Farewell to the Rights of
Women on Welfare? A Constitutional and Human Rights Analysis of the Personal
Responsibility Act, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 179, 195 (2001).
72. CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE § 11450.04(b) (1)-(3) (2004).
73. Sneed v. Saenz, 120 Cal. App. 4th 1220, 1230 (2004). A secondary objective
may be to send the message “that government is not in the business of ‘rewarding’
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However, the methods of achieving this and other similar goals are of
dubious merit.74 These programs attempt to further these goals via
behavior modification and the promotion of heterosexual marriages75
through the elimination of benefits for “capped” children.76 Morality
guides the legislation, which arguably coerces women into normal
families.77 These underlying issues are, perhaps, indicated best by the
California Legislature (in reference to CalWORKS): “The Legislature
finds and declares that the family unit is of fundamental importance to
society in nurturing its members, passing on values, averting potential
social problems, and providing the secure structure in which citizens live
out their lives.”78 Further, “[c]ontemporary welfare reform in the United
States is . . . framed by a moral panic about promiscuity among poor
women in general — and among poor women of color in particular.”79
The dichotomy of the undeserving vs. deserving poor informs public
assistance programs of who should and should not receive benefits.80
Professor Judith Koons traces the undeserving/deserving trope to the
beginning of American welfare in colonial America.81 There was a dual
system in place in which the deserving, elderly, widows, children, and the
sick, were given more relief and held in higher esteem than those seen as
undeserving, the able-bodied poor.82 The undeserving category included
“women who did not ‘abide by societal norms — and were abandoned or
never married’.”83 Today, this latter group is seen as the poster child of the
undeserving — the “Welfare Queen.”
In essence, these policies were and are based on stereotypes and
myths.84 In opposition to the stereotypical image of the “Welfare Queen”
who has children to get more money, empirical studies to date have not
shown any correlation between receipt of benefits and the procreative
childbearing among welfare recipients.” Sometimes, the message may even be as important
as the policy itself. Jane Gilbert Mauldon, Providing Subsidies and Incentives for Norplant,
Sterilization and Other Contraception: Allowing Economic Theory to Inform Ethical
Analysis, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 351, 355 (2003).
74. Center for Law and Social Policy, supra note 69.
75. Personal Responsibility Work and Opportunity Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No.
104-93, 101 Stat. 2110 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(3)(1996)): The
Congressional findings begin with “Marriage is the foundation of a successful society.”
76. Thomas, supra note 71, at 187.
77. Risa E. Kaufman, State ERAs in the New Era: Securing Poor Women’s Equality
By Eliminating Reproductive Based Discrimination, 24 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 191 (2001).
78. CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE § 11207 (2004).
79. Anna Marie Smith, The Sexual Regulation Dimension of Contemporary Welfare
Law: A Fifty State Overview, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 121, 124 (2002).
80. Carole M. Hirsch, Note, When the War on Poverty Became the War on Poor,
Pregnant Women, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 335, 339-40 (2002).
81. Judith E. Koons, Motherhood, Marriage, and Morality: The Pro-Marriage Moral
Discourse of American Welfare Policy, 19 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 29 (2004).
82. Id. at 30.
83. Id.
84. Hirsch, supra note 79; Kaufman, Thomas, supra note 71, at 194.
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decisions of unmarried women.85 Also, the size of the welfare family is
steadily decreasing in both family cap and non-family cap states.86 Thus,
the rationale for the programs is questionable.
Moreover, studies of the effects of the family cap programs themselves
have been negative or inconclusive.87 A 1998 study by Rutgers University
showed a small decrease in births after implementation of the New Jersey
family cap program, but it also showed an increase in abortions among
poor women.88 This fact has caused an unusual alliance between women’s
rights and anti-abortion groups, all of whom do not want to force women
into having abortions rather than have children they cannot afford under the
family cap policy.89 This alliance became apparent in the bipartisan effort
in New Jersey to ban the family cap policy in that state.90 That effort,
however, like most of the legal challenges thus far, failed.
3. Recent Legal Challenges to the Family Cap Program91
Litigation in the context of family cap policies is heavily informed, if
not doomed to failure, by the Supreme Court decision in Dandridge v.
Williams.92 In Dandridge, Maryland welfare recipients challenged the
Maryland maximum grant regulation (family cap policy) as a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause and the Social Security Act of 1935.93 In
short, the appellees claimed that the regulation illegally ‘capped’ the size of
a family at six members and, in effect, “denies benefits to the younger
children in a large family.”94 The Court held that the regulation complied
with both the Social Security Act because it did provide some assistance to
all qualified families; and the Equal Protection Clause, reviewed under a
reasonable basis standard, because the cap was justified by Maryland’s
85. Thomas, supra note 71, at 197.
86. Smith, supra note 79, at 170.
87. Center for Law and Social Policy, supra note 67.
88. Id.; Kaufman, supra note 77, at 206.
89. Hirsch, supra note 80, at 339-40.
90. H.R. 4066 (1998), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/ z?c107:h.r.
4066: (last visited May 23, 2005); Payne Takes Lead in Bill to Eliminate Family Cap,
http://www.house.gov/payne/press/pr980617.html (last visited April 11, 2006).
91. Additional, unsuccessful challenges have been brought in other jurisdictions on
the following grounds: 1) a family cap itself is unconstitutional, under the New Jersey state
constitution (Soujourner A. v. N.J. Dep’t of Human Servs, 177 N.J. 318 (N.J. 2003)); 2) the
requirement of assignment of child support payments for a ‘capped’ child constitutes a
taking, in violation of the fourteenth amendment (Williams v. Martin, 283 F. Supp. 2d 1286
(N.D. Ga. 2003) and Williams v. Humphreys, 125 F. Supp. 2d 881 (Ind. 2001)); 3) a family
cap infringes the right of family association (N.B. v. Sybinski, 724 N.E. 2d 1103 (Neb.
2000). For an informative discussion of family cap challenges across America, the
problems with constitutional challenges to family caps, and an alternative legislative focus
to combat family caps, see Kelly J. Gastley, Note, Why Family Cap Laws Just Aren’t
Getting It Done, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373 (2004).
92. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
93. Id. at 473.
94. Id. at 476.
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rationales of moving individuals from welfare to the workforce, equalizing
the welfare recipient and the worker, and encouraging family planning.95
This decision “lends support to the view that States can impose limits on
family size without fear that their decisions will be subjected to rigorous
scrutiny by the courts.”96 Thus, a woman on welfare’s decision to bear a
child is preempted by the state’s decision not to provide support.
The litigation regarding family caps continues. California recently
issued a decision on the breadth of its family cap program.97 In Sneed v.
Saenz, a California appellate court ruled that the California family cap plan
applies to all welfare recipients, and not just to “hard-core” ones.98 The
plaintiffs in this case were welfare recipients who also had additional nonwelfare income.99 They challenged the application of the family cap
program to their families.100 The court held that the cap applied to all
families, including those with earned income, and this was consistent with
the Legislature’s legitimate “goals of gradually reducing the cash grant,
while allowing a family’s income to increase without being discounted, as
the family works toward becoming self-sufficient.”101 The court also found
that “the MFG statute has no coercive effect so as to make it
unconstitutional.”102 The court dismissed the notion that the statute
interferes with fundamental privacy rights, and stated that no suspect class
is involved so as to require heightened scrutiny under equal protection.103
Under a rational basis standard of review the court held the legislature’s
purpose was legitimate.104
In contrast to the California case, in Mason v. State of Neb., the
Nebraska Supreme Court found there were exceptions to their family cap
program.105 The plaintiffs were disabled single mothers who did not have
the capacity to work.106 The court rejected the State’s argument that
interpreting the statute in question as not applicable to the plaintiffs would
raise an equal protection problem because there is a rational basis for
treating the plaintiffs differently from others who are subject to the family
cap.107 The court affirmed the finding that the family cap program did not
95. Id. at 487. Kirstin Andreasen, Part One: Family, the Constitution, and
Federalism: Dandridge v. Williams: The Supreme Court and Acceptable Family Size, 14 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 41, 42, 44 (2004).
96. Andreasen, supra note 95, at 46.
97. 120 Cal. App. 4th 1220 (2004).
98. Sneed, 120 Cal. App. 4th 1220.
99. Id. at 1228.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1244.
102. Id. at 1249.
103. Id. at 1250.
104. Id.
105. Mason, 267 Neb. at 44.
106. Mason, 267 Neb. at 46.
107. Id. at 54.
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apply to families in which there was no adult with the capacity to work
because “[a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative intent to apply the family
cap to such families, we must construe the Act in the manner which best
achieves its beneficent purposes.”108
A comparison of these two cases dealing with exceptions to family cap
programs highlights the underlying theme of deserving vs. undeserving
poor. In Mason, the plaintiffs were disabled and unable to work; they are
the deserving poor. In Sneed, the plaintiffs were welfare recipients who
were capable of working; they are the undeserving poor. It is not
surprising that the courts had opposite holdings.
4. Family Cap Programs as a Mechanism of Social Control
The family cap program seeks to enforce morality through coercive and
punitive methods, while possibly impinging on women’s reproductive
rights. The reasoning behind the programs is to decrease irresponsible
procreation, especially out-of-wedlock births, and to reduce government
funding.109 The methodology of the program is seemingly ineffective,
based on stereotypical images of undeserving poor and myths of welfare
mothers who have children to get more money. Yet, the recent legal
challenge does not seem to reach this stage of analysis. California courts
have found that family caps are rationally related to the government’s
legitimate purposes and the interest in being paid support is not
fundamental. California could, hypothetically, act more directly to
contravene a woman’s reproductive control and condition the receipt of
welfare payments on use of birth control.110 Perhaps this is the future of
welfare, or perhaps it is unconstitutional for the state to interfere so overtly
with a woman’s fundamental rights, but a growing and controversial
private organization does just that without legal intervention.

108. Mason, 267 Neb. at 55.
109. Kaufman, supra note 77, at 204-5.
110. See Kimberly A. Smith, Conceivable Sterilization: A Constitutional Analysis of
a Norplant/Depo-Provera Welfare Condition, 77 IND. L.J. 389 (2002). Smith’s analysis
finds that conditioning welfare on use of Norplant and Depo-Provera may be constitutional.
This conclusion may be based more in fact than in speculation since, as discussed above,
California, for example, has an exception to its family cap for those whose birth control
failed. The result is that those who use permanent or semi-permanent means of birth control
will get an increase in their benefits if they have additional children on welfare. Thus, use
(and failure) of birth control equals more welfare relief. Further, in 1990, shortly after
Norplant became available, policymakers suggested it be used to decrease the number of
children born to welfare mothers. All proposals made, however, faced heavy opposition,
and none successfully became law. Mauldon, supra note 73, at 354.
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B. PROJECT PREVENTION/CHILDREN REQUIRING A CARING KOMMUNITY
(C.R.A.C.K.)
1. Project Prevention — How It Works
Project Prevention, a privately-run organization, calls itself “a common
sense approach to a very serious problem,” but its logic is strikingly similar
to that of the progressive eugenicists of an earlier time.111 In 1996, foster
mom Barbara Harris, who saw firsthand the devastating effects of pregnant
women’s illegal drug use on their offspring, unsuccessfully sought to get
the Prenatal Neglect Act passed, which would have created the crime of
prenatal child neglect.112 Then in 1997, Harris founded an organization
called Children Requiring A Caring Kommunity, or C.R.A.C.K., now
renamed Project Prevention, in Pasadena, California.113 The purpose of the
organization is to “save our welfare system” and reduce the number of drug
addicted births.114 The methodology of the program is, however, very
controversial. Project Prevention attempts to achieve its worthy goals115 by
offering drug-addicted women $200 to get permanent or long-term birth
control.116 According to their website, Project Prevention has helped 1558
drug addicts by giving them the proffered payment upon proof of use of
Depo-Provera, Essure, IUD, Norplant, tubal ligation or vasectomy.117 In
essence, Project Prevention buys women’s reproductive capacities. There
111. Project Prevention at http://www.projectprevention.org (last visited April 11,
2006).
112. Lynn M. Paltrow, Why Caring Communities Must Oppose C.R.A.C.K./Project
Prevention: How C.R.A.C.K. Promotes Dangerous Propaganda and Undermines the Health
and Well Being of Children and Families, 5 J.L. SOC’Y 11, 17 (2003).
113. Vida Foubister, Crackdown on drug-addicted pregnancies draws concern,
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2000/11/20/prsa1120.htm (last visited
April 11, 2006).
114. Theyn Kigvamasud’Vashti, Communities Against Rape and Abuse, Fact Sheet
on Positive Prevention/CRACK (Children Requiring A Caring Kommunity), at
http://www.cwpe.org/sex%20lies%20contraception%20pack/fact%20sheet%20crack.pdf
(last visited Feb. 9, 2005).
115. The problem of substance exposed infants gained headlines in the late 1980s
and early 1990s. Estimates are that between eleven and fifteen percent of children born in
the United States have been exposed in utero to illegal drugs. Jennifer Mott Johnson, Note,
Reproductive Ability for Sale, Do I Hear $ 200?: Private Cash for Contraception
Agreements As an Alternative to Maternal Substance Abuse, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 205 at 205,
207 (2001).
116. Men also have gone through the program, but their numbers are small. For
example, as of June 2005, only 27 of the 1558 participants were men. Project Prevention at
http://www.projectprevention.org/programs/faqs.html (last visited June 27, 2005).
117. Project Prevention at http://www.projectprevention.org/program/index.html
(last visited June 27, 2005); Project Prevention at http://www.projectprevention.org/
program/faqs.html (last visited June 27, 2005). In August of 2002, the manufacturer of
Norplant suspended sales after settling the claims of thousands of women who said they had
not been adequately warned about Norplant’’ side effects. Andrew Harris, Ruling Finishes
off Norplant Suits, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 30, 2002 at B6. Other forms of implantable
contraceptives still exist.
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are several ethical and legal issues that arise from the program’s scheme.
2. Project Prevention — Eugenics as a Means of Population Control
“Don’t let a Pregnancy Ruin Your Drug Habit” read billboards and
flyers placed in poor neighborhoods in urban areas by Project Prevention
workers and volunteers.118 Instead of the “feeble minded” or others with
undesirable traits being targeted for negative eugenic measures, now it is
“poor, drug addicted, and often homeless women [who] are being coerced
into forever forgoing this fundamental right [of procreation].”119 The
difference between the forced or coerced sterilization under the
Asexualization Act and the coerced sterilization of drug addicts through
contract with Project Prevention, is that instead of targeting individuals
who are perceived as genetically inferior, Project Prevention is targeting
those who are socially inferior, and whose children, like those of their
eugenic antecedents, will be a burden on the welfare system.120
Supporters of Project Prevention argue unpersuasively that the program
is not eugenical in nature. One argument is that recipients of both the
permanent and the long-term methods of birth control receive the same
$200, thus it is far removed from the sterilization horrors of the eugenics
age.121 However, when Project Prevention first began it had a sliding
scale.122 Participants who opted for sterilization received more money than
their counterparts who had Norplant implanted or had a series of DepoProvera shots.123 A second argument is that $200 is not enough of an
incentive for an individual to sell her fertility.124 But even a scholar who
finds the program “efficient” and “ethical” acknowledges that “[f]or an
addict seeking an instant high, any incentive payment, no matter how small
might be a motivator.”125 A third argument is that no individual would
choose to get sterilized if he or she truly did not want to and was not
physically forced.126 Each individual has her own reasons for participating
in the program, but underlying all the decisions is the fact that these women
are drug addicts in need of cash. It is not paternalistic to acknowledge the
118. Kigvamasud’Vashti, supra note 114; Adam B. Wolf, What money cannot buy: a
legislative response to C.R.A.C.K., 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 173 at 178 (2000); Margaret
Merritt-Planned Parenthood Affiliates of CA, In a presentation to the Senate Select
Committee on Genetics, Genetic Technologies and Public Policy, July 16, 2003.
119. Wolf, supra note 118, at 189.
120. See Lisa Powell, Note, Eugenics and Equality: Does the Constitution Allow
Policies Designed to Discourage Reproduction Among Disfavored Groups?, 20 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 481 at 499 (2002).
121. Janet Ashley Murphy and Robert A. Pugsley, Successful Pregnancy Prevention
Program for Addicts Remains Under Siege, 5 J.L. SOC’Y 155, 170 (2003).
122. Renee Chelian, Remarks on the “Crack” Program: Coercing Women’s
Reproductive Choices, 5 J.L. SOC’Y 187, 189 (2003).
123. Id.
124. Murphy, supra note 121, at 170.
125. Mauldon, supra note 73, at 360.
126. Murphy, supra note 121, at 170.
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vulnerability of Project Prevention’s clients. Further, societal stereotypes
and myths, promulgated by Project Prevention, may play a role in why
some women have chosen to participate.
3. Project Prevention and Societal Myths
Project Prevention, like the eugenicist movement and welfare reform,
is based on myths and stereotypes. The image of the typical client of
Project Prevention is that of the crack cocaine addict, reminiscent of the
“Welfare Queen”: lazy, drug-addicted prostitutes, who are irresponsible
and do not love their children.127 Certainly this image pre-existed Project
Prevention. In the 1980s the “crack baby crisis” made regular headlines, as
did the punitive measures taken against some of the mothers.128 Even now,
when medical research shows that fetal cocaine exposure is not as harmful
as previously thought, the image is still powerful.129 Project Prevention, or
C.R.A.C.K. as it was first named, capitalized on these images to draw
attention to itself. Although the organization vehemently denies charges
that it is racist,130 the choice of the name C.R.A.C.K. alone is questionable
considering that crack cocaine is widely known as a drug that is more
popular in African-American communities than in white communities.131 If
the goal of the program is to “stop children winding up in foster care or
with long-term health problems, whose care puts an enormous burden on
the taxpayer,”132 then why target crack cocaine users in particular? Further,
most of the advertising has been in poor communities of color.133
Racism aside, another myth is that drug addicts have large numbers of
children.134 This is untrue. “[S]tudies have shown that low-income women
with publicly identified drug problems have an average of two to three
children each.”135 Yet, this image is reified by the organization itself.
Harris has been quoted as saying “[t]hese women literally have litters of
127. Paltrow, supra note 112, at 23-24.
128. For an informative discussion of the criminalization of drug addiction and the
history of the sterilization of Black women in America, see Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing
Drug Addicts Who Have Babies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991).
129. Murphy, supra note 121, at 172.
130. “It is racist, or at least ignorant, for someone to learn about our program and
assume that only black addicts will be calling us. Not all drug addicts are black.” Project
Prevention at http://www.projectprevention.org/program/faqs.html (last visited June 27,
2005).
131. Roberts, supra note 128, at 1419.
132. Clare Murphy, Selling Sterilisation to Addicts, BBC NEWS ONLINE, Sept. 2,
2003, http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/
americas/3189763.stm. Further if the goal of Project Prevention is to give poor women
“access” to birth control, why not use the money and efforts to promote sex education in the
schools or inner city clinics? Project Prevention at http://www.projectprevention.org/
program/faqs.html (last visited June 27, 2005).
133. Chelian, supra note 122, at 190.
134. Andrew Gumbel, America’s New Family Values, INDEP. (London), Nov. 25,
2003, at 4.
135. Paltrow, supra note 112, at 38.
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children! They’re not acting any more responsible than a dog on heat.”136
Finally, another myth is that these women have unintended pregnancies
because they are unusually irresponsible.137 “C.R.A.C.K. portrays its
clients as breeding machines, uniquely prone to unintended
pregnancies.”138 However, more than half of all pregnancies in the United
States are “mistakes.”139 Further, viewing a woman as a “dog on heat” (sic)
shows the failure of Project Prevention “to see women who struggle with
substance abuse as capable of the same sort of motivation for having
children as all women.”140 Thus, Project Prevention appears to be a new
means of controlling the population. The question remains — is it legal?
4. Project Prevention- Unstoppable by the Laws of Contract?
a. Informed Consent and the Capacity to Contract
One issue regarding the legality of Project Prevention is whether a
valid informed consent can be given by its drug addicted clientele. In
addition to the addiction problem, many of these poverty-stricken women,
to whom $200 is a powerful incentive, also experience “disproportionate
rates of sexual and physical violence, HIV, mental illness, homelessness,
instability, imprisonment and death row sentences, posttraumatic stress
disorder, and repetitive micro- and macro-aggression and insults as a result
of oppression.”141 Thus, Project Prevention is on notice that not only may
the woman be impaired since drug addiction is a requirement of the
program, but she is likely dealing with other issues that will affect her
ability to make rational decisions.142
There is an argument that the women who contract with C.R.A.C.K.
are not capable of making a valid contract with the organization.143 If a
woman was under the influence of drugs at the time of the formation of the
contract, it is questionable whether she had the capacity to make it.144
However, it would be unlikely that at the time she was actually sterilized
she would be under the influence of drugs, since the medical facility should
have tested her to make sure there were no substances in her body that
136. Gumbel, supra note 134.
137. Paltrow, supra note 112, at 40-41.
138. Id. at 40.
139. Id. at 41.
140. Chelian, supra note 122, at 191.
141. Kigvamasud’Vashti, supra note 114.
142. Johnson, supra note 115, at 230.
143. Id.
144. Johnson, supra note 115, at 230. It would probably be unlikely that the
individual’s drug addiction would make a court find the person incompetent. “Illustrations
of incompetence severe enough to make a party’s contractual obligations voidable include
brain damage caused by accident or organic disease, mental illness with symptoms such as
delusions and hallucinations, and congenital intelligence deficiencies. One could question
whether the law should consider addiction an ‘incapacity’ at all.”
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would interfere with the surgery.145 Thus, incapacity is unlikely to be a
successful attack to void the contract.
b. Unconscionable and Against Public Policy
Alternatively, a court might find the contract to be unconscionable.
“C.R.A.C.K.’s clients are coerced into relinquishing their reproductive
rights; it is an arrangement between two parties with grossly unequal
bargaining power.”146 One’s reproductive capacity in exchange for $200
seems to fit the definition of unconscionable.147
The strongest argument to invalidate a contract between Project
Prevention and a client is that the contract is unconscionable and is against
public policy. By drawing an analogy between surrogacy agreements and
agreements such as Project Prevention’s pay for sterilization, there is a
cogent line of reasoning that the latter would also be found invalid if
challenged.148 Surrogacy and adoption agreements that involve the
exchange of money for the custody of a child are held against public policy
for several reasons under state law, such as: the prohibition of money for
child exchange; termination of parental rights requires proof of that
parent’s unfitness; revocable surrender of custody; and the idea that
children should be raised by their natural parents.149 Another reason to
hold against surrogacy agreements, albeit a paternalistic one, is that these
agreements particularly attract poor women who “need to be protected
from exploitation.”150 It is this latter reason that most aptly mirrors the
circumstance of the Project Prevention client: severely uneven bargaining
positions.
Another analogy can be drawn between the selling of body parts or
organs and Project Prevention’s buying of reproductive capacity.151 The
National Organ Transplant Act prohibits the receipt of money for an
organ.152 The idea behind the Act was to prevent the commodification of
human organs.153 “Simply put, it is wrong to buy or sell irreplaceable body
parts.”154 Similarly, it can be said that it is wrong to buy or sell one’s
reproductive capacity, the potential to have children, because it is a
fundamental right. One argument against this analogy is that the Project
Prevention client has the choice whether to have permanent or long-term
145. Johnson, supra note 115, at 230.
146. Wolf, supra note 118, at 181-83.
147. An unconscionable agreement is defined as “an agreement that no promisor
with any sense, and not under a delusion, would make, and that no honest and fair promisee
would accept.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 28 (2nd Pocket ed. 2001).
148. Wolf, supra note 118, at 180.
149. Johnson, supra note 115, at 232-33.
150. Id. at 233.
151. Wolf, supra note 118, at 181-83.
152. Id. at 181; National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. § 274e (1994).
153. Wolf, supra note 118, at 181-83.
154. Id. at 183.
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birth control as opposed to permanent organ removal.155 However, that
argument would mean that it is acceptable to “lease” one’s fertility, but not
to “sell” it.
c. Contract Defenses Fall Short
Contract defenses, even if successful, fall short in very practical ways.
First, Project Prevention itself would never seek court enforcement of its
contract with a client because the contract is not formed until after the
client has had the medical procedure for sterilization or long-term birth
control.156 Second, it will be useless for a woman to have the contract
invalidated after she has performed her part of the contract and gone
through with the surgery. A sterilization procedure is permanent, even if a
court later decides that the contract was invalid because of lack of informed
consent, lack of capacity, unconscionability or invalidity as against public
policy.157 Since contract law does not offer any solution to the Project
Prevention problem, a private actor may be legally able to coerce a woman
into surrendering her fertility. But this leaves open the issue of whether a
state could similarly make an unconscionable deal with a woman in
compromising circumstances.
C. CONTRACEPTION AS A TERM OF PROBATION
A third type of modern eugenics is contraception as a term of
probation. Like family caps and Project Prevention, it acts punitively to
prevent the undeserving from reproducing. In 1991, in a California
Superior Court, Darlene Johnson pled guilty to child abuse and was given
an unusual term of probation.158 Johnson, an unwed mother of four and
pregnant with her fifth child, became the first woman ordered by a court to
be implanted with Norplant.159 This form of “creative sentencing,”160 while
155. Jane Gilbert Mauldon, Providing Subsidies and Incentives for Norplant,
sterilization and other contraception: allowing economic theory to inform ethical analysis,
September 22, 2003, Gale Group, Inc., American Society of Law & Medicine, Inc.,
JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE & ETHICS.
156. Johnson, supra note 115, at 232-3.
157. Id. at 231.
158. NARAL Foundation, Reproductive Freedom & Choice, Unjust Punishment,
Forced Contraception, and Poor Treatment of Women by the Courts and Prisons,
http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/facts/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm+P
ageID=1784 (last visited Feb. 15, 2005).
159. Id. Norplant is a long-term contraceptive that is implanted under the skin of a
woman’s arm. It is made up of six tubes the size of matchsticks that contain synthetic
hormones. It is very effective, lasts for about five years, and then must be removed
surgically by a physician. Additionally, like most drugs, Norplant has side effects and is not
appropriate for women with certain heath conditions. Janet F. Ginzberg, Compulsory
Contraception as a Condition of Probation: The Use and Abuse of Norplant, 58 BROOK. L.
REV. 979, 980 (1992).
160. Johnson’s probation condition was never fulfilled because it was rendered moot
when, for a violation of another condition of her probation, Johnson was sentenced to
prison. Ginzberg, supra note 159, at 979 n.1.
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a first of its kind, is not totally unprecedented. In fact, since the 1960s
there have been at least 20 cases where judges have ordered convicted
persons not to procreate or to use some form of contraception, or even to be
sterilized.161 Compulsory contraception is arguably unconstitutional as an
interference with constitutionally fundamental privacy rights,162 and is
being used to further eugenic goals.163
1. Sterilization as Punishment
Not long after the Supreme Court upheld Virginia’s sterilization law in
Buck v. Bell,164 it called procreation “a basic liberty” and “one of the basic
civil rights of man.”165 In Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, the
Supreme Court invalidated, on equal protection grounds, Oklahoma’s
Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act,166 which provided for the sterilization
of persons convicted of two or more crimes “amounting to felonies
involving moral turpitude.”167 The statute distinguished between
individuals convicted of embezzlement and those, like Mr. Skinner, who
had been convicted of larceny.168 However, Skinner did not overturn Buck.
The Court instead distinguished Buck in part because “the defendant [was]
given no opportunity to be heard on the issue as to whether he is the
probable potential parent of socially undesirable offspring” and the state
did not attempt to prove that larcenous individuals have “biologically
inheritable traits which he who commits embezzlement lacks.”169 Thus, the
Court stuck by its earlier pro-eugenics stance, but decided that there was no
compelling reason why only one group of criminals should be so punished
and not the other.170 Nevertheless, Skinner has come to be remembered as
the first case to establish that procreation is a fundamental right.171

161. NARAL Foundation, supra note 157. An early “no pregnancy” case was that of
People v. Dominguez, 256 Cal. App. 2d 623 (1967). In Dominguez, the defendant was a
young unmarried mother of two pregnant with her third child. Id. at 625. She was charged
with second degree robbery for driving the get-away car. Id. at 624-25. She was placed on
probation. Id. at 625. One of the conditions of her probation was: “The third condition is
that you are not to live with any man to whom you are not married and you are not to
become pregnant until after you become married. . . . You have already too many of those
. . . Do you know where the Planned Parenthood Clinic is?” Id. On appeal, the condition
was found void because it was not directly related to the crime of robbery. Id. at 628.
162. A discussion of the constitutional right to privacy and how those concepts
interact with modern forms of eugenics follows this section.
163. See Ginzberg, supra note 159, at 984.
164. 274 U.S. 200.
165. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
166. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 171 (1935), invalidated by Skinner v. Oklahoma ex
rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
167. Skinner, 316 U.S. 535 at 536, 538.
168. Id. at 538-39.
169. Id. at 538, 541.
170. Id. at 542.
171. Silver, supra note 16, at 869.
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2. Governmental Coercion
If procreation is a fundamental right, then one would think that the
state must have a compelling objective in order to require contraception as
a term of probation. Actually, courts get to sidestep this issue because the
individual can choose between the proffered terms of probation or to go to
prison. It is his or her choice. This distinction is well illustrated in a recent
case involving a deadbeat dad.
David Oakley pled no contest to three counts of intentional refusal to
pay child support.172 Oakley was sentenced to probation, but the judge
imposed a special condition: “while on probation, Oakley cannot have any
more children unless he demonstrates that he had [sic] the ability to support
them and that he is supporting the children he already had.”173 Oakley’s
history, which warranted such creative sentencing, showed that he was the
father of nine children by four different women and that he was a repeat
offender.174 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld the lower court
because it reasoned: (1) “probation conditions — like prison regulations —
are not subject to strict scrutiny analysis;” (2) “incarceration, by its very
nature, deprives a convicted individual of the fundamental right to be free
from physical restraint, which in turn encompasses and restricts other
fundamental rights, such as the right to procreate;” and (3) Oakley still has
a choice — he can procreate if he can support all of his children.175 While
this case is decidedly different from California’s Johnson case because here
the defendant is not physically implanted with a contraceptive device,
Oakley parallels the infringement on the right to procreate as punishment.
The dissent in Oakley astutely points out that the choice presented to
Oakley is illusory. The trial court imposed the condition on Oakley fully
aware that he would never be able to support all of his children.176 Thus,
for the probation term, Oakley will be in violation if he fathers another
child. In other words, “the birth of a child [will] carry criminal
sanctions.”177 Also, the court proscribed only the fathering of another
child, not engagement in sexual intercourse.178 This means that if Oakley
impregnates a woman during the probationary period, she will be forced to

172. State of Wisconsin v. Oakley, 2001 WI 103, ¶ 4, 245 Wis. 2d 447, 453, 629
N.W.2d 200, 202.
173. Id. at ¶ 6, 245 Wis. 2d at 454, 629 N.W.2d at 203.
174. Id. at ¶ 3, 245 Wis. 2d at 452, 629 N.W.2d at 202.
175. Id. at ¶ 16 n.23, ¶ 19, ¶ 20, 245 Wis. 2d at 465 n.23, 468, 473, 629 N.W.2d at
208 n.23, 209, 212.
176. Id. at ¶ 49, 245 Wis. 2d at 485, 629 N.W.2d at 217 (Bradley, A.W. dissenting)
quoting the trial judge: “You know and I know you’re probably never going to make 75 or
100 thousand dollar [sic] a year. You’re going to struggle to make 25 or 30. And by the
time you take care of your taxes and your social security, there isn’t a whole lot to go
around, and then you’ve got to ship it out to various children.”
177. Id. at ¶ 41, 245 Wis. 2d at 482, 629 N.W.2d at 216.
178. Id. at ¶ 47, 245 Wis. 2d at 483, 629 N.W.2d at 217.
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decide between having an abortion or sending Oakley to prison.179 So
either the government is coercing abortion or is creating a situation in
which Oakley’s children will continue to suffer because their father is
imprisoned and unable to work to support them.180
Returning to the State of California, Johnson, like Oakley, was to
surrender her right to procreate, but further was also to forgo her right to
refuse a medical procedure.181 Yet, California has made some headway
into finding restrictions on procreation as terms of probation violative of
state and federal constitutions. In People v. Zaring, a California Court of
Appeal found that a judge’s182 condition that the defendant not get pregnant
during the probationary period was invalid because it was impermissibly
overbroad.183 In Zaring, the defendant had been convicted of heroin
charges, and not child abuse like in Johnson.184 The court did not,
however, decide whether it would ever uphold a no pregnancy term if the
underlying crime related to the well-being of a child born or unborn.185
The court in Zaring, however, noted that the rationale of the sentence
was more morality driven than rehabilitative in purpose.186 The judge
made this distinction fairly obvious when he told the defendant: “I want
make [sic] to make it clear that one of the reasons I am making this order is
you’ve got five children. You’re thirty years old. None of your children are
in your custody or control. Two of them [are] on [welfare]. And I’m afraid
that if you get pregnant we’re going to get a cocaine or heroin addicted
baby.”187 While the court addresses this issue, it does not expressly say
that moral judgments of how many children one has and at what age is not
the business of the law. Instead it says: “In our view, the morality of having
children while on public assistance, and the imposing of any
constitutionally permissible legal deterrences to such a practice, are matters
179. Id. at ¶ 57, 245 Wis. 2d at 489, 629 N.W.2d at 219.
180. Id. at ¶ 60, 245 Wis. 2d at 490, 629 N.W.2d at 220.
181. In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), the
Supreme Court acknowledged that there is a significant liberty interest in refusing medical
treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
182. The judge was, in fact, the same judge as in the Darlene Johnson case. Judge
Howard R. Broadman was later publicly censored for “conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.” The Supreme Court
of California, in upholding Broadman’s censure, reviewed both the Johnson case and the
Zaring case. Broadman v. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 18 Cal. 4th 1079, 1087
(1998).
183. 8 Cal. App. 4th 362, 372 (1992).
184. Id. at 365.
185. Id. at 372; In a recent out-of-state case, a Georgia mother of seven pled guilty to
voluntary manslaughter of her 5- week-old daughter rather than face a life sentence if
convicted of murder. A condition of her sentence is that she undergo a tubal ligation. Errin
Haines, Ga. Mom Admits Killing, to be Sterilized, Feb. 9, 2005, BOSTON.COM,
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2005/02/09/ga_mom_admits_killing_to_be_ste
rilized/.
186. Zaring, 8 Cal. App. 4th at 373.
187. Id. at 368.
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properly left to the wisdom and judgment of the legislature elected by the
people, and not to the morality of individual judges.”188 In other words, if
the legislature wants to restrict the procreation of a woman receiving
assistance, as in the instance of family caps, it can. And it can do so
because of morality. The court’s statement in Zaring regarding preference
for letting the legislature make the moral decisions, is telling of the true
rationale for procreative restrictions: preventing the unfit from becoming
parents.189
IV. THE RIGHT TO PERSONAL AUTONOMY AS

ENCOMPASSED IN THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

The modern forms of eugenics impinge on the right to procreate. Since
Skinner, other Supreme Court cases have cemented and clarified the right
to procreate as a fundamental right encompassed in the right to privacy.
Griswold v. Connecticut, an early reproductive rights case, established the
right of married people to use contraceptives.190 The Court found the
fundamental right to privacy in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights.191
Douglas, writing for the majority, said that the guarantees in the Bill of
Rights create “zones of privacy.”192
In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the right established in Griswold to use
contraceptives, was extended to unmarried individuals on equal protection
grounds.193 In Eisenstadt, the Court made it clear that the right of privacy
belongs to the individual. “If a right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”194
Next in Loving v. Virginia, from which the strict scrutiny standard was
born, an interracial married couple challenged Virginia’s miscegenation
statute and won.195 The Court, while discussing equal protection in great
depth, founded its decision on privacy grounds and on the fundamental
right to marriage.196 The Court proclaimed: “Marriage is one of the ‘basic
civil rights of man’ fundamental to our very existence and survival. . . .
The 14th Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be
restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution, the
freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the
188. Zaring, 8 Cal. App. 4th at 374.
189. See California’s Compulsory Sterilization Polices 1909-1979: Hearing Before
the S. Select Comm. on Genetics, Genetic Technologies and Public Policy, 2003 Leg. (Cal.
2003) (statement of Valerie Small Navarro, ACLU).
190. 381 U.S. 479.
191. Id. at 483.
192. Id. at 484.
193. 405 U.S. 438.
194. Id. at 453.
195. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
196. Id.
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individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”197
In the controversial landmark case, Roe v. Wade, the Court founded its
decision to protect a woman’s right to choose an abortion prior to viability
in the 14th Amendment’s Due Process Clause.198
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action, as we feel it is, or as the District Court determined, in
the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad
enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy. The detriment that the State would
impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice altogether
is apparent.199
A woman has a right, but not an absolute right, to terminate her
pregnancy.200
The abortion right declared in Roe, however, was limited in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.201 In Casey, the Court
set forth a new standard of an undue burden or substantial obstacle test.202
Thus, states can now discourage abortion, so long as its methods do not
create a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion
pre-viability.
More recently, Lawrence v. Texas has reinforced the idea of a right to
sexual privacy.203 In Lawrence, the Court invalidated a Texas sodomy law
that made homosexual sex illegal.204 The Court decided in this case that
the constitutionally protected right to privacy encompassed sexual activity
regardless of whether it was heterosexual or homosexual in nature.205 The
Court also stated that moral condemnation of homosexual activity does not
have a place within our laws:
It must be acknowledged, of course, that . . . for centuries there
have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as
197. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
198. 410 U.S. 113.
199. Id. at 153.
200. Id. at 154: “We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes
the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against
important state interests in regulation.” The Court goes on to establish a trimester system in
which the government is allowed to create restrictions on abortion after viability of the
fetus.
201. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
202. “[T]he undue burden standard is the appropriate means of reconciling the
State’s interest with the woman’s constitutionally protected liberty.” Id. at 876.
203. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
204. Id.
205. Id.
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immoral. The condemnation has been shaped by religious beliefs,
conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the
traditional family. . . . These considerations do not answer the
question before us, however. The issue is whether the majority
may use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole
society. . . . Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to
mandate our own moral code.206
Lawrence overruled Bowers v. Hardwick,207 which held that laws
making sodomy illegal were constitutional.208 In Bowers, the Court held
that there is no constitutional right to homosexual sexual privacy.209 While
Lawrence did not hold that there is a fundamental right to homosexual sex,
it did hold that the Texas statute in question violated the privacy rights of
homosexuals under a rational basis test.210
Thus, the evolution of the Supreme Court’s recognition of a
constitutionally protected right to privacy has resulted in an increasingly
strong right to freedom in the realms of sexual and reproductive rights.
The Court has also made the individual the central decision-maker
regarding his or her own reproductive or sexual privacy and restricted the
use of moral condemnation as a limitation of fundamental rights. Yet, the
modern forms of eugenics permitted by the California are products of
moral condemnation. They are being utilized as means of restricting and/or
thwarting an individual’s expression of her fundamental right to procreate.

V. CONCLUSION
In sum, California has made many advances in acknowledging and
moving away from its eugenic past, yet it still has a long way to go.
California is at a crossroads. While the State apologized for its past abuses
to further eugenic goals, it now uses or allows semi-cloaked eugenic
practices to continue. Modern eugenics takes the form of family caps,
exchanges of money for sterilization, and the looming threat of prohibition
on procreation as a term of probation. The target population has not really
changed, the terminology has just been adjusted ever so slightly: it is no
longer the biological defective who will produce undesirable offspring, but
instead, the socially unfit parent who will raise undeserving offspring.

206. Id. at 571 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850
(1992) (internal quotations omitted)).
207. “Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It
ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is
overruled.” Id. at 578 (Stevens, J., concurring).
208. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
209. Id.
210. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
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